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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Levying of court fees at common law has a very long and complex history dating back to as early 
as 13th Century.1 Fees have always been charged to users of Courts.2 Malawi’s justice system 
was erected upon this English system allowing for levying of fees in judicial institutions. In 
Malawi, the Courts Act3 governs the levying of court fees. This is a piece of legislation enacted 
immediately after receiving independence from Britain in 1964.4 Court fees are set out in a 
schedule to section 32 of the Courts Act. The Courts Act gives the power to the Chief Justice 
from time to time by notice published in Gazette to revoke, replace or amend the schedule.5 
Since its enactment, this schedule has been amended, revoked and replaced five times.6 For a 
long time, such levying of court fees was kept relatively low so as to facilitate access to justice.7 
During the 2004 court fees revision, Malawians living in one of the least developed countries and 
predominantly agricultural based,8 were paying court fees within the equivalent of 0.48 USD.9 
This is against a background of approximately inflation of around 5-6 percent as of 201210 and 
50.7 % of the 15.91 million people living below the poverty line.11 That notwithstanding, high 
level of attendant cost for processing applications coupled with prohibitive costs of legal services 
                                                           
1
 P. Polden, A History of the County Court 1846-1971, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 153 
2
 P. Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, A 
History to 1940, (1997-1998) 47 DePaul Law Review, 232 
3
 Cap. 3:02 of the Laws of Malawi 
4
 B.P. Wanda, Legal Aid Services in Malawi, (1975) 1 Washington University Law Review, 113 - 116 
5
 Section 32(2) of the Courts Act 
6
 General Notice Number 152 of 1977, General Notice Number 63 of 1997, General Notice Number 31 of 1998, 
General Notice Number 41 of 2004 and General Notice Number 35 of 2011 
7
 F. Kanyongolo, Malawi Justice Sector and Rule of Law: A review by AFRIMAP and Open Society Initiative for 
Southern Africa, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa  (Open Society Foundation, 2006), 134 
8
 K. Pauw,  et. al., Exchange Rate Policy and Devaluation in Malawi, (Washington, DC: International Food Policy 
Research Institute, 2013), 1-3, http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp01253.pdf (last accessed on 
5 May 2014) 
9
 According to the General Notice Number 41 of 2004, Malawians were supposed to pay K60 (equivalent of 0.48 
USD) as fees payable for court proceedings. 
10
 Pauw, Op. Cit, p. 2 
11
 http://data.worldbank.org/country/malawi (last accessed on 6 May 2014)  Field Code Changed
 2 
heavily contributed towards an upward revision of court fees.12 The Chief Justice executed the 
powers vested in his office and with the approval of the Minister of Justice under section 32 of 
the Courts Act by replacing the schedule in General Notice Number 35 of 2011. This led to a one 
thousand two hundred and forty nine percent (1, 249%) increase in court or filing fees.13 
Malawians now had to pay an equivalent of 50 USD as court fees with an inflation rate of 24%.14 
This increase prompted an outcry from the media and the public15 and later resulted in litigation. 
The Chief Justice and Minister of Justice were sued by private citizens under judicial review 
proceedings in the case of The State and The Honourable The Chief Justice and The Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs Ex-parte: Ralph Kasambara, Malawi Law Society and 
Hophmally Makande.16 It was argued that both the Chief Justice and the Minister of Justice had 
exercised their powers unreasonably and not in line with their authority by revising the court 
fees. Further that the fees in essence were contrary to the right to access justice as many 
Malawians could not afford 50 USD as court fees.17 An interim injunction was granted freezing 
the new court fees and pending judicial review hearing. Three years later the matter was 
withdrawn and settled out of court paving way  for a full enforcement of Courts (Schedule) 
(Replacement) Notice, 2011.   
 
                                                           
12
 Government Notice Number 35, issued on 26 August, 2011 also known as Courts (Schedule) (Replacement) 
Notice, 2011 
13
 According to Government Notice Number 35, Court Fees were reviewed upwards from K60 to K25, 000 for an 
Ex-parte application for an injunction. 
14
 http://www.nsomalawi.mw/index.php/latest-publications/consumer-price-indices.html (last accessed on 5 May 
2014) 
15http://www.malawidemocrat.com/politics/malawi-%E2%80%98selling%E2%80%99-justice-up-fees-for-court-
injunctions/ (accessed on 1 March 2014)  
16
 The State and The Honourable The Chief Justice and The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Ex-parte: 
Ralph Kasambara, Malawi Law Society and Hophmally Makande, Judicial Review Cause No. 41 of 2011 
(Unreported) 
17
 Ibid 
Field Code Changed
Field Code Changed
 3 
This article explores court fees legislation in Malawi and how the same affects the right to access 
justice.18 The discussion considers arguments for and against the upward revision of court fees 
including discriminatory or limitational tendencies based on poverty.bordering on poverty. In 
conclusion, this article suggests a policy-oriented approach19 to reviews, consultations and the 
enactment of court fees legislation. There is need to clarify and implement common interests of 
various stakeholders20 in accordance with their expectations21 and public trust so as to fulfill their 
fiduciary duty.22  The article further suggests that in the process of analyzing data, policy 
formulation and enactment, decision-makers should bear in mind the prescriptive purposes of the 
law that demand a focus on the realities of authority and control.  In order to facilitate actual 
decision making, policy oriented approach proposes that there should be consideration of the goal 
formulation,23 trend description,24 factor analysis,25 projection of  
future decisions26 and invention27 of alternatives.28 Human dignity or human good is the 
                                                           
 
18
 For purposes of this article the concept of access to justice focuses on two basic objectives of the Malawi legal 
system being (a) that it is accessible to people from all levels of society and (b) that it is able to provide fair 
decisions and rules for people from all levels of society, either individually or collectively. The fundamental idea to 
be mainstreamed in this concept is the achievement of social justice for all citizens. 
19
 Sometimes known as the ‘New Haven Approach’ or ‘Law, Science and Policy.’ It is a jurisprudence that 
considers law as a decision making process that includes both policy and statute or treaty.  
20
 Chief Justice, Minister of Justice, Malawi Law Society, General Public 
21
 S. Wiessner ‘Law as a Means to Public Order of Human Dignity: The Jurisprudence of Michael Reisman’ 
(2009) 34 Yale Journal of International Law, 526 
22
 Section 12 (i)  to (iii) of the Constitution of Malawi sets out fundamental Principles as follows: ( i.) All legal and 
political authority of the State derives from the people of Malawi and shall be exercised in accordance with this 
Constitution solely to serve and protect their interests; (ii) All persons responsible for the exercise of powers of State 
do so on trust and shall only exercise such  power to the extent of their lawful authority and in accordance with their 
responsibilities to the people of Malawi; (iii) The authority to exercise power of State is conditional upon the 
sustained trust of the people of Malawi and that trust can only be maintained through open, accountable and 
transparent Government and informed democratic choice. 
23
 Consideration of the aims or objectives of the legislation  
24
 The practice in the past in terms of decision making relating to court fees 
25
 The current circumstances within which the decision or legislation will operate 
26
 The likely impact or effect of the decision or legislation 
27
 Any suggestions that can help to cushion the impact of the decision or legislation  
28
 M. Reisman, et. al. ‘The New Haven Scholarship: A Brief Introduction’, (2007) 32 Yale Journal of International 
Law, 576 
 4 
core value for formulating legal principles.29 It is what all human beings value.30 In order to 
achieve this human good or value, it is proposed that there should be a balance between the 
cost of court system and access to justice. Attention should therefore go to the decision-makers 
as “participants” who are endowed with power of decision-making. Further, attention should be 
placed to their “perspectives” or subjective dimensions that animate their decision-making 
process. Lastly, for the balance to achieved, there should be an analysis of their “bases of power” 
or resources upon which they draw their power and the “strategies” or ways they manipulate 
those resources.31 
 
I. THE CASES FOR AND AGAINST INCREASE IN COURT FEES A  
CASE FOR COURT FEES 
Since the Chief Justice in conjunction with the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
amended the Courts Act adjusting court fees upwards under Government Notice Number 35 of 
26 August, 2011, heated debate arose as to the legality and reasonableness of the new court fees.  
Proponents of an upward revision of court fees have argued that revised court fees are reasonable 
when set against a policy of full cost recovery for services provided by the Courts.32 Attendant 
costs for processing such applications are expensive resulting in Courts incurring costs. 
Obtaining an ex-parte application is even higher as the court is moved at odd hours.33 The Court 
                                                           
29
 M. McDougal, H. Lasswell (1996) ‘The New Haven School’ in R. Beck, et. al. (eds.) International Rules: 
Approaches from International Law and International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 109, 111 
30
 Ibid 
31
 Reisman, Op. Cit,  578 
32
 The State and The Honourable The Chief Justice and The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Ex-parte: 
Ralph Kasambara, Malawi Law Society and Hophmally Makande, Judicial Review Cause No. 41 of 2011 
(Unreported), Submissions by Honourable The Attorney General Representing The Chief Justice and The Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
33It would require fuel, subsistence/ meal allowances, stationary, communication for the Honourable Judge, 
Registrar and members of the judiciary 
 5 
fees levied contribute towards judiciary funds that are paid out in accordance with law.34 
Therefore, section 32 of the Courts Act,35 grants power to High Court to levy fees as set out in a 
schedule. This is in respect of proceedings and matters before court.36It further provides that the 
Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Minister of Justice, from time to time, by notice 
published in the Gazette, revoke, replace or amend the schedule.37  That notwithstanding, the 
High Court may in any cause or matter , if it thinks fit, dispense in whole or in part with the 
payment of any fee chargeable under the schedule on the grounds of the poverty of any party or 
other person or for any other reason.38 Proponents of court fees have also argued that court fees 
provide for increased funding for the courts to deliver justice.39 Further, reviewing court fees 
improves court efficiency as courts effectively recover full cost that enable them competently 
discharge their duties. 40  Increased court fees can help curb wasteful litigation such as abuse of 
court process which mostly results in public resources being spent inefficiently.41 Courts can be 
clogged with interim injunction relief and the main action is never pursued.42 Therefore, court 
fees ensure that the Plaintiff has something at stake which is of palpable or tangible value as 
opposed to being merely abstract or theoretical.43 Some cases do not warrant to go through court 
process as they can be easily settled out of court.44t has further been argued that increased court 
fees can help improve access to justice curtailing the abuse of the court process which mostly 
                                                           
34
 Section 4(3) of the Judicature Administration Act Chapter 3:10 of the Laws of Malawi 
35
 Chapter 03:02 of the Laws of Malawi 
36
 Section 32(1) of the Courts Act 
37
 Section 32(2) of the Courts Act 
38
 Section 32(3) of the Courts Act 
39F. Michelman, ‘The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights – Part H’ 
(1974) 3 Duke Law Journal, 527 
40
 P. Spector, ‘Financing the Courts through Fees: Incentives and Equity in Civil Litigation’ (1974-1975) 58 
Judicature, 330 
41
 Spector, Op. Cit, p. 330 
42
 T. Tembo, ‘Review of Filing Fees’, Case Flow and Record Management Workshop of The International Senior 
Lawyers Project Support to Malawi Judiciary, 13 to 17 December , 2010, (Blantyre: Mount Soche, 2010) 
(unpublished paper). 
43
 Spector, Op. Cit, p.332 
44
 Tembo, Op. Cit, p.2 
 6 
results in public resources being spent inefficiently.45 Courts can be clogged with interim 
injunction relief and the main action is never pursued.46 Court fees ensure that the Plaintiff has 
something at stake which is of palpable or tangible value as opposed to being merely abstract or 
theoretical.47 Some cases do not warrant to go through court process as they can be easily settled 
out of court.48 It is suggested arguable that the Chief Justice is vested with powers to revise court 
fees. In doing so, the Chief Justice takes cognizance of economic realities attendant to court 
users.49 Therefore, such a revision by the Chief Justice will not be a bar to access to justice.50 
Instead of negatively affecting the right to access justice, a review of court fees improves access 
to justice as courts effectively recover full cost and are able to discharge their duties and 
obligations competently.51 The more the resources that the treasury has, the better the delivery of 
access to justice by the courts.52  Further, the High Court may in any cause or matter , if it thinks 
fit, dispense in whole or in part with the payment of any fee chargeable under the schedule on the 
grounds of the poverty of any party or other person or for any other reason.53 Therefore, this 
discretion to waive fees provides access to justice. Legal Aid availability is another tool that 
enables access to justice. It has been argued that  
 
                                                           
45
 Spector, Op. Cit, p. 330 
46
 T. Tembo, ‘Review of Filing Fees’, Case Flow and Record Management Workshop of The International Senior 
Lawyers Project Support to Malawi Judiciary, 13 to 17 December , 2010, (Blantyre: Mount Soche, 2010) 
(unpublished paper). 
47
 Spector, Op. Cit, p.332 
48
 Tembo, Op. Cit, p.2 
49
 The State and The Honourable The Chief Justice and The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Ex-parte: 
Ralph Kasambara, Malawi Law Society and Hophmally Makande Case,  Submissions by Honourable The Attorney 
General 
50
 Jumbe & Mvula –v- Attorney General Constitutional Case Number 1 & 2 of 2005 (Unreported), it was held that in 
order to prove  a limitation, the State must produce evidence to justify imposition of limitation to a relevant right. 
51
 P. Spector, ‘Financing the Courts through Fees: Incentives and Equity in Civil Litigation’ (1974-1975) 58 
Judicature, 330 
52F. Michelman, ‘The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights – Part H’ 
(1974) 3 Duke Law Journal, 527 
53
 Section 32(3) of the Courts Act 
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It has further been argued that increased court fees can help improve access to justice curtailing 
the abuse of the court process which mostly results in public resources being spent 
inefficiently.54 Courts can be clogged with interim injunction relief and the main action is never 
pursued.55 Court fees ensure that the Plaintiff has something at stake which is of palpable or 
tangible value as opposed to being merely abstract or theoretical.56 Some cases do not warrant to 
go through court process as they can be easily settled out of court.57 It has further been argued 
that tthose people that cannot afford revised court fees will always be protected by the Legal Aid 
Act58 provided that there is an assessment and proof as to insufficient means of such persons.59 
Any costs can upon an order or agreement be chargeable on any property, damages or other 
amount made in favour of any legally aided person.60 Proponents of court fees have argued that 
an assessment as to means and contribution at Legal Aid is a built-in guarantee that people may 
question whether or not it is wise to bring an action.61 Notwithstanding arguments for an upward 
review of court fees, such acts reduce access to justice.  
 
Opponents of court fees revision have argued that Courts (Schedule) (Replacement) Notice, 2011 
is an unusually, unjustifiable and excessive review.62 It does not that does not recognize the 
                                                           
54
 Spector, Op. Cit, p. 330 
55
 T. Tembo, ‘Review of Filing Fees’, Case Flow and Record Management Workshop of The International Senior 
Lawyers Project Support to Malawi Judiciary, 13 to 17 December , 2010, (Blantyre: Mount Soche, 2010) 
(unpublished paper). 
56
 Spector, Op. Cit, p.332 
57
 Tembo, Op. Cit, p.2 
58
 Chapter 4:01 of the Laws of Malawi 
59
 Sections 18(1)(b) and 20(b) of Legal Aid Act Number 7 of 2011, Chapter 4:01 of the Laws of Malawi 
60
 Section 22 of the Legal Aid Act Number 7 of 2011 
61
 A.W, Jongbloed., ‘Access to Justice, Costs and Legal Aid’ (2007) 11(1) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 7 
62
 The State and The Honourable The Chief Justice and The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Ex-parte: 
Ralph Kasambara, Malawi Law Society and Hophmally Makande Case,  Submissions by The 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
Applicants  
 8 
economic realities confronting average Malawians who live below the poverty line.63 Therefore, 
such a 1,249% fee rise has an ultimate result of reducing access to justice. The Constitution of 
Malawi grants equal protection to everyone.64 It is suggested that the court fee rise takes away 
that protection. Poor people are less likely to afford the new fees. It is further suggested that this 
is contrary to rule of law and public policy. Under section 32 of the Courts Act, the Chief Justice 
may revoke, revise or replace the schedule providing for court fees.65 It is argued this is not 
mandatory but discretionary on the Chief Justice. Further to this, it is also discretionary on the 
High Court to dispense in whole or in part with the payment of any fee chargeable under the 
schedule on the grounds of the poverty of any party or for any other reason.66 It is arguable that 
in practice there is minimal or no evidence of Courts following this provision.67 All cases have 
had a filing or court fee levied on them or else the court cannot process them.68 Courts have 
heavily relied on the Legal Aid Act69 that those people that cannot afford court fees will always 
be protected provided that there is an assessment and proof as to insufficient means of such 
persons.70 Any costs can upon an order or agreement be chargeable on any property, damages or 
other amount made in favour of any legally aided person.71 From these statutes, it is submitted 
that no guidance can be obtained from the Courts Act, Legal Aid Act or case law about what 
constitutes “the grounds of poverty of any party” or “an assessment and proof as to insufficient 
                                                           
63
 Eggen, O., ‘Making and Shaping Poor Malawians: Citizenship Below the Poverty Line’, 31(6) Development 
Policy Review, 697, 699 
64
 Section 4 of the Malawi Constitution provides that: This Constitution shall bind all executives, legislative and 
judicial organs of the State at all levels of Government and all the peoples of Malawi are entitled to the equal 
protection of this Constitution, and laws made under it. 
65
 Section 32(2) of the Courts Act 
66
 Section 32(3) of the Courts Act 
67
 The State and The Honourable The Chief Justice and The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Ex-parte: 
Ralph Kasambara, Malawi Law Society and Hophmally Makande Case,  Submissions by The 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
Applicants 
68
 Ibid 
69
 Chapter 4:01 of the Laws of Malawi 
70
 Sections 18(1)(b) and 20(b) of Legal Aid Act Number 7 of 2011, Chapter 4:01 of the Laws of Malawi 
71
 Section 22 of the Legal Aid Act Number 7 of 2011 
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means.”72 It is arguable that the grounds of poverty and proof as to insufficient means is 
joblessness, the wage or net pay of an employee in a month, if a business person or farmer the 
amount of money or profit he or she makes in a month or at the end of a farming season. From 
this premise, itit is therefore  is submitted that the court should be able to reflect or mirror 
policy73 that enables a penniless litigant to access justice. The indigent or penniless litigant and 
the wealthy should all have equal access to justice.Court fees should not be used as a tool for the 
wealthy against the indigent.74 The Constitution of Malawi guarantees observance of the rule of 
law by all institutions and persons75, recognition and protection of fundamental rights76 such as 
access to justice. The State has a duty to actively promote the welfare and development of the 
people of Malawi in accordance with principles of national policy77 by progressively adopting, 
interpreting78 and implementing policies and legislation aimed at achieving, inter alia, the 
promotion of law, order and respect for society, honest practices in government, adequate 
resourcing, and the humane application and enforcement of laws and policing standards.  
 
III. ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR THE POORLIMITATIONS  
It is argued that section 32 of the Court’s Act has been interpreted in such a way that has heavily 
impacted on the poor. It has hampered the poor person’s constitutional right to recognition 
before the law.It is suggested that section 32 of the Courts Act should be construed in light of 
                                                           
72
 It is suggested that grounds of poverty and proof as to insufficient means is joblessness, the wage or net pay of an 
employee in a month. For a business person or a farmer, the amount of money or profit he or she makes in a month 
or at the end of a farming season. 
73
 Wiessner, Op. Cit, p. 526 
74
 M.R, Anderson, Access to Justice and legal Process: Making Legal Institutions Responsive to Poor People in 
LDCs, (London: Institute of Development Studies, 2003), 21 http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp178.pdf (accessed 
on April, 2014) 
75
 Section 12 (1) of the Malawi Constitution; see also State and Malawi Regulatory Authority (MERA) Ex-parte: 
Chilivumbo Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 176 of 2011 (H.C. Lilongwe District Registry) (unreported), per Justice 
Kachale 
76
 Section 12(iv) of the Constitution of Malawi 
77
 Section 13(m) of the Constitution of Malawi 
78
 Section 14 of the Constitution of Malawi 
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section 41 of the Constitution that provides for every person’s right to recognition before the 
law.79,  Further, such limited understanding of section 32 has hindered access to any court of law 
or any other tribunal with jurisdiction for final settlement of legal issues.80 In the end, there is no 
right to and right to an effective remedy by a court of law or tribunal for such poor people.acts 
violating the rights and freedoms granted by the constitution or any other law.81 Access to justice 
justice has been held to represents the hallmark of a civilized society.82 The Malawi Constitution 
fully embraces this aspiration83 and it should not be departed from. Therefore, its interpretation 
of access to justice must reflect the unique character84 and nature of what parliament intended. It 
must not be construed in a narrow legalistic and pedantic85 way but broadly and purposively86 so 
as to bring to bear the great purpose of the Constitution, namely protection of the poor. Such 
access to justice facilitates access and protection of other rights..87 Thus fee waiver cannot be 
justified as an option for the courts to poor people. This is so because it is a mechanism that is 
rarely pursued by the courts as to some extent relies on the same fees for its operations.88 
Practically, the Malawi judiciary is heavily underfunded and its annual budget needs are rarely 
met.89 Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect the courts to waive costs that will go towards its own 
operational costs unless government improves its funding. In the same line, it is argued that 
                                                           
79
 Section 41(1) of the Constitution of Malawi 
80
 Section 41(2) of the Constitution of Malawi 
81
 Section 41(3) of the Constitution of Malawi 
82
 Baromoto-v- Minister of Home Affairs 1998 (5) BCLR 562 (W) 
83
 Section 41 of the Constitution on access to justice  
84
 Section 11(1) of the Malawi Constitution 
85
 S. Kayuni, ‘ The Narrow, Legalistic and Pedantic Version of Locus Standi: CILIC Case, A Death knell to Actio 
Popularis in Malawi’ (2008) 8(1) Unima Students Law Journal, 41 
86
 Fred Nseula –v- Attorney General and Malawi Congress Party MSCA Civil Appeal Number 32 of 1997 (MSCA) 
(unreported) ;See also The State and Malawi Electoral Commission – Ex-parte Rigtone Mzima, MSCA Civil Appeal 
No 17 of 2004 (unreported), per Tembo JA,  5 and 6 
87
 D. Kaersvang, ‘ Equality Courts in South Africa: Legal Access for the Poor’ (2008) 15(2) The Journal of 
International Institute, 4 
88
 L. Silverstein, ‘Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil Cases’ (1967-1968) 
2 Valparaiso University Law Review, 21 
89
 R. Ellett, Pathway to Judicial Power in Transitional States: Perspectives from African Courts, ( Oxon, Routledge, 
2013), 103 
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though in theory legal aid can help resolve access to justice,90 the mechanism does not 
adequately work as the Legal Aid Bureau is poorly funded,91leading to low staffing levels.92 
Unlike most other Constitutions, the Constitution of Malawi elevates some rights above others. 
Section 44 of the Constitution prescribes certain rights and prohibitions as non-derogable. 
Included in the non-derogable rights are two which are stipulated in section 44(1)(g) i.e. ‘the 
right to equality’ and the right to ‘recognition before the law’. These are therefore two distinct 
rights which are elevated above all others except for those non-derogable rights listed in section 
44(1).93 That notwithstanding, it is important to distinguish between sections 41(1) and 20(1) of 
the Constitution. The later enshrines the right to equality by proscribing all forms of 
discrimination. However, the prohibition against discrimination and the recognition of a person 
before the law are conflated94 into the same concept of equality. It is therefore posited that 
underlying Malawi’s constitutional order is the idea of the rule of law which entails formal 
equality and equal treatment before the law and the outlaw of discrimination. The prohibition 
against discrimination and the recognition of a person before the law relate to the same concept 
of equality. It is suggested that in order to determine whether or not section 32 of the Courts Act 
as read with Courts (Schedule) (Replacement) Notice, 2011 conforms to the overriding principle 
                                                           
90
 D. Rhodes, ‘ Access to Justice’, (2000-2001) 69(5) Fordham Law Review, 1785-1811 
91
 G. Siri & F.E. Kanyongolo, ‘Courts and the poor in Malawi: Economic Marginalization, Vulnerability, and the 
Law,’ (2007) 5(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law, 258-293 
92
 C. McKen. ‘Legal Education in Malawi’, (1997) 23 The John Marshall Law Review, 55 
93
 The only rights which are non-derogable are: the right to life, right to equality and recognition before the law; and 
the right to freedom of conscience, religion, belief and thought and the right to academic freedom. Further to this, it 
should be noted that the singular term ‘right’ seems to be used in the Constitution even when more than one right is 
involved. It should be no wonder that it is used in section 44(1)(g) to refer to two distinct rights; the right to equality 
and the right to recognition before the law. 
94
 D. Chirwa ‘Upholding the sanctity of Rights: A Principled Approach to Limitations and Derogations under the 
Malawian Constitution’ (2007) 1(1) Malawi Law Journal, 5 
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of access to justice, it must pass the test in section 44 of the Constitution. Section 44 (so far as 
relevant) provides as follows: 
Limitations on rights   
 1.   There shall be no derogation, restrictions or limitation with regard to - 
          (g) the right to equality and recognition before the law;  
2.  Without prejudice to subsection (1), no restrictions or limitations may be placed on 
the exercise of any rights and freedoms provided for in this Constitution other than 
those prescribed by law, which are reasonable, recognized by international human 
rights standards and necessary in an open and democratic society.  
3.   Laws prescribing restrictions or limitations shall not negate the essential content of 
the right or freedom in question shall be of general application.  
It is conceded from the above provision that constitutional rights to access justice and effective 
remedies can be limited, derogated from or restricted. The only requirement is that such 
restriction or limitation must satisfy the test in section 44(2) and (3) of the Constitution that such 
limitation must be prescribed by law, be reasonable, be recognized by international human rights 
standards, be necessary in an open and democratic society, not negate the essential content of the 
right or freedom in question and be of general application.95 It is suggested that in considering 
limitations of the enjoyment of access to justice, regard must be had to the effect of such 
limitation and not its purpose.  Court fees being part and parcel of an entire process put in place 
for the administration of justice are intended to facilitate the process than to obstruct or limit it. 
Procedure is the machinery of law, the channel and means whereby law is administered and 
justice is reached. Court fees departs from its office where instead of facilitating the said 
administration of justice, it is permitted to obstruct or even extinguish legal rights. It is thus made 
to govern where it ought to sub-serve.96 The majority of Malawians are poor and live below the 
poverty line.97 It is posited that the social status of being indigent is protected under section 20(1) 
                                                           
95
 Nelson Jasi-v- Republic Criminal Appeal Number 64 of 1997 (HC, Principal Registry) (unreported) 
96
 Henry JB  Kendal & others –v- Peter Hamilton [1887] 4 AC 504, per Lord Penzance 
97
 http://data.worldbank.org/country/malawi (accessed on 2April 2014) Field Code Changed
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of the Constitution. What is prohibited is discrimination of persons in any form.98 The fact that 
poverty is not specifically mentioned does not require that it be treated differently from alleged 
discrimination based on grounds specifically mentioned in the relevant provision. Notably, the 
provision guarantees equal and effective protection against discrimination on grounds which 
extend, beyond those specifically listed, to any ‘other status.’ Poverty is a characteristic bearing 
similarly to that of property, which is specifically mentioned. It therefore follows that any 
excessive upward revision of court fees is an unjustifiable limitation to the right to equality and 
cannot stand in an open and democratic society. 
 
IV. SETTING FEES - A POLICY–ORIENTATEDED APPROACH  
As demonstrated in the foregoing, the fee increases effected by the Chief Justice and Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs were too substantial. Further to this, they were preceded by 
insufficient consultation. Inadequate provision was made to ensure access to justice for those 
who could not afford the new fees. This is contrary to Ssection 41 of the Republican Constitution 
upholds the right to access justice and legal remedies. It thus follows that the State shall not 
obstruct persons who turn to the courts to have their rights determined or protected. Any 
domestic law or measure that imposes costs or obstructs access to courts must be regarded as 
offending the tenets of the Constitution. The executive cannot in law abrogate the right to access 
justice as: 
‘…..the infringement of such a right [the right of access to a court] must be either expressly 
authorized by a provision in an Act of Parliament or arise by necessary implication. Even where it 
can be said that the making of a rule under powers to make rules by subordinate legislation arise by 
necessary implication, it will still be in question whether the rule formulated is reasonable. Even 
where the need for such a rule does arise by necessary implication either because the purpose of 
Parliament cannot be achieved without it or the function of Parliament has laid on a person or 
                                                           
98
 In the Matter of the Admission of David McRester Nyamirandu and In the Matter of the Legal Education and 
Legal Practitioners Act (Cap. 3:03 of the Laws of Malawi) Constitutional Case Number 3 of 2008 (HC, Principal 
Registry)(Unreported) 
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cannot be discharged without it, the rule will be ultra vires the rule making power if the rule as 
framed is unreasonable; if it is wider than is necessary, if it infringes the fundamental right to a 
greater extent than is required.’99 
 
When the Chief Justice pursuant to powers vested in his or her office under section 32 of the 
Courts Act sets reasonable court fees, such an act does not constitute interference with an 
individual's right of access to justice. Whether court fees are set at a reasonable level is a separate 
question from whether it is appropriate for a particular individual having regard to his means. 
The section gives discretion to the Chief Justice with the approval of the minister by notice in the 
gazette to revoke, replace or amend the schedule. It is suggested that in an open and democratic 
society, it is important for the two offices as participants in the decision making process to make 
public consultations in order to clarify and implement their common interests.100 This should be 
done in accordance with the participants’ expectations in controlling101 litigation. The two 
offices should forecast to the extent possible, alternative future decisions and their consequences 
that would provide tools for proper decision-making.102 Justice Potani in adopting the dictum of 
Morris, J in Fletcher –v- Minister of Town and Country Planning103 has ably explained what 
constitutes consultation:  
“….the word consultation is one that is in general use and that is well understood. No useful purpose 
would, in my view be served by formulating words of determination. Nor would it be appropriate to 
seek to lay down the manner in which consultations must take place. The Act does not prescribe any 
particular form of consultation. If a complaint is made of failure to consult, it will be for the court to 
                                                           
99
 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and others, ex p Saleem, [2000] All E.R. 814 (Court of Appeal), 
In granting judicial review of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s refusal to entertain an application for leave to 
appeal, the Court struck down r.42(1)(a) of the Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules 1996. That rule provided that 
notice of a special adjudicator’s determination was deemed to have been received two days after posting, regardless 
of whether or when actually received. The Court held the rule to be ultra vires the enabling Act since it went beyond 
regulating rights of appeal and was destruction of such right (which were fundamental rights akin to access to courts 
of law). 
100
 In this article social sciences is viewed as a mode of organizing data about various social processes, modality of 
phase analysis  and analytical break-down of the actual components of a decision  
101
 S. Ratner & A. Slaughter, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers’, (1999) 93 
American Journal of International Law, p.294 
102
 M. Reisman, et. al. ‘The New Haven Scholarship: A Brief Introduction’, (2007) 32 Yale Journal of International 
Law, 576 
103
 [1947] 2 All ER 496, 500 
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examine the facts and circumstances of the case and to decide whether consultation was, in fact, 
held...” 104 
   
From the above premise, it can be argued that the facts and circumstances will guide the courts’ 
determination on whether the conduct of the Chief Justice and Minister of Justice amounted to 
consultation. It is suggested that various meetings and public views solicitation would be ideal in 
making sure that considerations of the indigent Malawians to attain access to justice.   
 
Another issue that seriously needs attention is the forma pauperis105 principle mirrored in section 
32(3) of the Courts Act. It provides that the High Court may in any cause or matter, if it thinks 
fit, dispense in whole or in part with the payment of any fee chargeable under the Schedule on 
the grounds of poverty of any party or other person or for any other reason. Forma pauperis is a 
statutory provision that first appeared in 11 Henry 7, c.12 of 1494. By that statute there was a 
waiver of fees payable to the Crown, the appointment of clerks and, among other things, the 
appointment of an attorney. All this was meant to assist a poor person who had a case which 
would not be heard without such assistance.106 As the practice developed, it became a 
requirement in the mid 1700's that the pauper provide affidavit evidence that he was not worth 5 
pounds and that the application be accompanied by counsel's opinion. The standard of 
impecuniosity later became more generous providing that proof was required that the person 
seeking to sue as a pauper not only must provide proof that he was not worth 5 pounds but that 
he must also have an opinion from counsel that he had reasonable grounds for the proceeding.107  
                                                           
104State and The President of the Republic of Malawi Ex-parte Dr. Bakili Muluzi and John Z.U Tembo 
Miscellaneous Civil Cause Number 99 of 2007 (HC) (unreported), per Justice Potani 
105
 Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition explains this term as an indigent person seeking public assistance, waiver of 
court fees, free public service or appointment of counsel. 
106
 Clifton –v- Dexter & Crozier Ltd [1923] NZLR 1042 (CA); see also Yeatts –v- Raupekapeka Sawmill Co. Ltd 
[1958] NZLR 739 (CA), 743 
107
 Cook v. Imperial Tobacco Co., [1922] 2 K.B. 158,163, per Lord Justice Banks 
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Efficient Legal Aid mechanism has eventually replaced this common law of forma pauperis.108 
Notwithstanding this, it is It is therefore suggested that lack of due consideration to forma 
pauperis in Malawi where legal aid is so patchy and there exists extreme poverty, is in itself a 
breach of a fixed feature of common law that was codified by section 32(3) of the Courts Act. 
This is a piece of legislation that should always be contemplated by all participants whose aim is 
achieving a common purpose109 namely the attainment of human good. Frequent use of the 
provision among judicial officers can be a tipping point for all to emulate.110 It is aimed at 
helping out the poor and it does not foresee an affluent litigant or a person of some social 
prominence but contemplates the financially poor. It is further suggested that financial 
difficulties do not necessarily equal an indigent status. A person of scant means does not 
necessarily constitute a pauper but a person without any means.111 The failure of the High Court 
to seriously take into account the underlying differences between individuals in society on the 
basis of poverty notwithstanding the statutory provision granting discretion to waive fees, 
amounts to a denial of equal benefit of the law. The right to access the courts is under the 
Constitution one of the foundational pillars strengthening the rights and freedoms of Malawians. 
Its protection should therefore be guaranteed at all cost. 
 
It would be inconceivable that Parliament should describe in such detail the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution and should not first protect that which alone makes it possible to 
                                                           
108
 Nicholas Paul Alfred Reekie and Attorney General and District Court at Waitakere & Nicholas Paul Alfred 
Reekie and Department of Corrections and Visiting Justice To Spring Hill Correctional Facility SC 47 /2013 [2014] 
NZSC 63, Judgment of 29th May, 2014, para 9 
109
 G. Kelling & C. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1997) 241 
110
 M. Gladwell The Tipping Point, (New York, Back Bay Books, 2002), 9 
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benefit from such guarantees, thus, access to court. The fair, public and expeditious 
characteristics of judicial proceedings are of no value at all if there are no judicial proceedings.112 
Of what value are the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution if a person is denied 
access to a court of competent jurisdiction in order to vindicate them? How can the courts 
independently maintain the rule of law, and effectively discharge the duties imposed on them by 
the Constitution if  accessif access to them is hindered, impeded or denied? Already, courts are 
sparsely located with limited number of judicial officers available. Government Notice No. 35 of 
2011 cripples the already hindered access to justice in Malawi. 
 
In order for the participants to the revocation, amendment or replacement of the schedule under 
section 32(2) of the Courts Act to achieve human good and constitutional order, they need to 
consider eight suggested human values.113 These are power114, wealth115, enlightenment116, 
skill117, well-being118, affection119, respect120and rectitude.121  Human dignity is assumed or 
                                                           
112
 Golder v. United Kingdom (1975), 1 E.H.R.R. 524, 536 
113
 McDougal,  Op. Cit, pp. 122 – 124; policy-oriented jurisprudence advocates for these values as goals that every 
community wishes to attain in order to achieve human dignity 
114
 To what extent is power widely or narrowly held by those involved in the decision-making process such as the 
Chief Justice and Minister of Justice? It also considers how many other people or members of the community in 
which the decision is to be implemented are involved (be it direct or indirect) in enacting prescriptions, 
recommendations or invocations? To what extent are the processes of adjustment coercive or persuasive? E.g. how 
intense is the expectation of opposition to proposals for revision? How intense is the expectation of coming to a 
consensus without risking litigation or injunction? 
115
 To what extent is the economy focused on savings and investments? For instance, what are the fiscal measures that 
influence a revision of the court fees? Further, whether during implementation will the community afford or withstand 
the impact the revision will bring. Are there minimum income guarantees on the part of the community? 
116
 To what extent does the community protect the gathering, transmission and dissemination of information? 
For instance, to what extent has there been dissemination of information related to the increase so as to not only have 
public participation but also prepare them for the effects of such a rise in filing fees. 
117
 To what degree is the body politics committed to the opportunity for discovery and cultivation of socially 
acceptable skills on the part of everyone? For instance, is there universal and equal access to educational facilities 
where negotiating skills can be attained? Are new skills recognized and assisted readily? Are there skills that would 
enable the community appreciate the implications of settling a matter out of court than taking it to court where there is 
likelihood of paying a high filing fee? 
118
 To what extent is continued increase of numbers encouraged even at the expense of immediate improvement 
of the values available to individuals. To what extent is the population sought to be protected from mental and 
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postulated deliberately in order to leave everyone free to justify it in terms of his or her 
preferred theological or philosophical tradition.122 Therefore, the policy oriented approach will 
enable participants develop tools to bring about changes that will attain human good.123 When 
decision-makers consider revoking, removing or replacing the schedule under section 32 of 
the Courts Act, they have to bear in mind that there is also a constitutional duty to guarantee 
access to justice. Therefore, in interpreting what constitutes and indigent person, it is 
suggested that decision-makers should focus on restoring faith in the soundness of the legal 
system. Such interpretive skills will further make policymakers realize that prescriptive purposes 
of the law demand a focus on realities of authority and control.124 Alternative future decisions 
on section 32 of the Courts Act and their consequences should provide conceptual tools that 
can propagate or lead to alternative decisions125 when it comes to access to justice. It is 
suggested that reliance on Legal Aid Bureau as a vehicle for achieving access to justice for the 
indigent is wrong. Decision-makers’ satisfaction should not be drawn from the existence of 
Legal Aid Bureau as this office is not only understaffed126, underfunded127 but also not available 
all over Malawi.128 It is therefore imperative that Malawi should aim at adopting and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
physical deprivation? To what extent is the degree of development, health, comfort, social security of population? How 
well psychologically prepared is the community not to lose trust and confidence in the State for hiking the court fees? 
119
 What is the protection given to the indigent family and other institutions of congeniality?  
120
 What is the commitment to caste or to mobile class forms of society? To what extent is 
minimum respect accorded to everyone on the basis of mere membership of the human race? Is 
there equality and respect for all?  
121
 To what degree does the body politic protect freedom of worship and of religious propaganda? E.g. Moral and 
religious teachings about helping the poor and the weak in society. 
122
 McDougal, Op. Cit, p. 122 
123
 Human  dignity  is  postulated  deliberately  in  order  to  leave everyone free to justify it in terms of his or 
her preferred theological or philosophical tradition; see generally  McDougal, Op. Cit 
124
 S.Wiessner above note number 11, 526 
125
 M. Reisman, above note number 13, 576 
126
 H. Anderson, ‘ Justice Delayed in Malawi’s Criminal Justice System Paralegals vs. Lawyers’ (2006) 1(1) 
International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences, 2 
127
 D. McQuid-Mason, Assessment of Legal Aid in the Criminal Justice System in Malawi, Kwazulu Natal, 
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 http://ruleoflawmalawi.blogspot.co.uk/2011/10/legal-aid-act-2010.html (last accessed on 6 May 2014) Field Code Changed
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implementing strategies that will guarantee a flourishing pro-access to justice constitutional 
order bearing in mind economic realities of Malawians. It should further be presided over by an 
inventive and activist judiciary that is aided by a proficient bar, supported by the state and 
cherished by the public. Such reflection of economic realities must widen the concept of poverty 
to include not only those who are below the poverty line, but also persons living above the 
poverty line who nevertheless experience financial difficulties in obtaining access to justice.129 A 
sufficient flexibility for an objective interpretation of section 32 of the Courts Act will reinforce 
constitutional order in Malawi as opposed to revocations, amendments or replacements of the 
schedule. The executive as part of a broader network of mechanisms for public order 
should be a catalyst for encouraging access to justice in the courts so as to enhance the rule 
of law in Malawi. The judiciary should exercise discretion while weighing the economic 
realities obtaining in the country with those of the litigation cost incurred by the Courts.  
 
Access to justice is the decisive basis of the entire justice system in Malawi. Its character 
demonstrates that even twenty years after the adoption of a human rights regime in the 
country, it is still operating on virgin grounds with no case law to tap from.130 The State 
needs to encourage and adopt processes that do not cost the credibility of the courts. It is 
submitted that review, revocation or replacement of the schedule is ultimately a political 
goal rather than a legal one. It is further submitted that the promise or nascent of access to 
                                                           
129
 G. Chan, ‘The Rights of Access to Justice: Judicial Discourse in Singapore and Malaysia’ (2007) 2(1) Asian 
Journal of Comparative Law, 2 
130
 The State and The Honourable The Chief Justice and The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Ex-parte: 
Ralph Kasambara, Malawi Law Society and Hophmally Makande Case which had given hope to Access to justice 
and Court fees litigation ended up being withdrawn from Court and a consent judgment paving way for full 
implementation of the  Courts (Schedule) (Replacement) Notice, 2011. 
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justice in Malawi is a phenomenon anchored in power, yet simultaneously capable of 
transcending it.  
 
Court fees should be viewed as a process rather than just an implementation of a rule. It 
must be done systematically and openly131 based on common expectations132 of 
Malawians. Power should not just be about impositions of unilaterally made decisions that 
offend constitutionalism. It must at all times in as far as constitutionalism is concerned 
enhance both law and order.133 Norms and normative outlooks should matter in formations 
of order134 as far as they attain stable models that are beneficial.135 It is submitted that even 
though review, revocation or replacement of schedule under section 32 of the Courts Act 
remains at the heart of legal debate in the Malawi, its mystical moss136  should be 
understood as essentially a decision making process that considers then indigent and 
guarantees access to justice. 
  
It is suggested that startegies employed by the participants should include prescription of court 
fees in such a way as not to deprive a citizen of his or her constitutional right to access the 
courts.137 Therefore, dialogue among participants should include proposals for increased court 
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 H. Koh, ‘Is there a ‘New’ New Haven School of International Law?’, (2007) 32 Yale Journal of International 
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 O. Hathaway, ‘The Continuing influence of the New Haven School’, (2007) 32 Yale Journal of  International 
Law, 558 
133
 Ibid 
134
 C. Borgen, ‘Whose Public, Whose Order? Imperium Region and Normative Fiction’, (2007) 32 Yale Journal of 
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Legal Education, 254 
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funding that can result in increased court access for the poor.138 Malawians should not feel short-
changed139 and lose trust in the courts that are a core foundation to democracy. Administration of 
justice may be fair and just. If it cannot be effectively accessed, people are not protected. Right 
to access justice enshrined in the constitution plainly represents an expression of the peoples’ 
aspirations.140 It must at all cost be protected.  
 
The principal features to access justice are the people (with all their cultural, economic and social 
peculiarities) and the institutions. Further features are the processes that represent the elements 
from which law originates, lives and evolves.141 The justice system within which these features 
operate must be an inseparable and integrative part of the more complex communal system that 
cannot be artificially isolated from economics, ethics and politics.142 Enhancing access to justice 
is for the benefit of the poor and especially the vulnerable. It further contributes towards the 
struggle to change the social and economic conditions that underpin Malawi’s legal order and  
seriously overlooked by policy makers.143 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Insufficient consultations and lack of regard for access to justice for poor people led to a 
substantial increase in court fees in Malawi. This article attempted to examine contextual 
factors and legal criteria of the present state of access to justice in Malawi and the 
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opportunities from the theoretical framework of policy-oriented jurisprudence that views law as 
derived from elements of authority and control in determining reviews, amendment or 
replacement of schedule under section 32 of the Courts Act. This has been through an analysis 
from the debates in Malawi arising from the recently published Courts (schedule) 
(Replacement) Notice Number 35, 2011 under section 32 of the Courts Act gazetted on 26th 
August, 2011, rule development and its limitational elements. Human dignity in the 
context of this article has been described as an advocacy for non-discriminationatory 
policies on the basis of social status such as means or poverty when considering and 
consulting on review of court fees that heavily affect the right to access justice under the 
Republican Constitution. In order to achieve human good, the Chief Justice and Minister 
of Justice must make public consultations in order to effect section 32 of the Courts Act. 
The fact that these human goods, in some cases described as political calculus 144 do not 
come out clearly under section 32 of the Courts Act gives room for broader interpretation 
that the framers of that piece of legislation might have intended to leave to the participants 
to determine. No one should be subjected to discrimination on the basis of his or her social 
status. It is posited that in the execution of powers vested under section 32 of the Court’s 
Act, the Chief Justice and Minister of Justice on the one hand and all relevant stakeholders 
on the other must mirror the animus of the framers of that section, reading it with sections 
20 and 41 of the Constitution and the genesis of common law allowing for filing of forma 
pauperis.    
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The 1249% increase in court fees as reflected in the notice obstructs access to justice. 
Notwithstanding justifiable derogations from human rights145, the notice amounts to 
discrimination based on poverty affecting poor peoples’ right to equality and recognition before 
the law. It does not conform to fundamental principles governing non-discrimination.146 It draws 
a formal distinction between the litigant and others on the basis of their means. It further fails to 
take into account the litigant’s already disadvantaged position within the Malawian society 
resulting in substantively differential treatment based on enumerated and analogous grounds. It 
withholds a benefit from the litigant in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of a 
presumed group. This perpetuates a view that an individual is less worthy of recognition or value 
as a member of Malawian polity, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration. It is 
suggested that the Notice was therefore designed to preclude those with limited means ending up 
with typecast or pigeonhole assumptions about the poor. Access to justice as a right must be 
given the greatest measure of protection.147 It is salutary to remember that the poor need the law 
more than the rich. If access to justice is limited to the rich, the poor are likely to resort to 
vigilantism. The consequences of it are bound to have a disastrous effect on the maintenance of 
law and order. If the poor Malawians see the legal and judicial system in existence as mainly 
serving the interest of the rich and the powerful it is likely to result in a death-knell of the rule of 
law and democracy.148 
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